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Protecting Student Speech Rights While Increasing
School Safety: School Jurisdiction and the Search for
Warning Signs in a Post-Columbine/Red Lake
Environment
I. INTRODUCTION
Adam Porter’s little brother wanted to draw a llama.1 He found a
discarded drawing pad in the closet, drew the llama, and took it to school
the next day to show his middle-school teacher.2 An otherwise
uneventful day at school transformed abruptly when another student
flipped through the pad during the bus ride home and discovered a more
provocative sketch drawn by Adam two years before: a crude rendition
of the high school under siege by tanker truck, missile launcher,
helicopter, and gunmen.3 The student immediately alerted the bus driver,
and the school suspended Adam’s brother from school the next morning
for possession of the picture.4 Adam, however, suffered the most severe
consequences.5 Officials at East Ascension High School searched Adam,
a junior, and recommended he be expelled.6 He was also locked in jail
four nights for “terrorizing the school.”7 More than three years later, in
December 2004, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declared Adam’s
sketch fully protected under the First Amendment.8 In the time between
1. Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 611 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125
S. Ct. 2530 (2005).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 611–12.
5. Id. at 612.
6. Id. The school officials’ decision was supported, at least partially, by the discovery of a
box cutter; a notebook with references to death, drugs, sex, and gangs; and a fake ID in Adam’s
backpack. Id. It is important to recognize, however, that the box cutter was for his after-school job,
and that this event transpired before terrorists used box cutters in the September 11th hijackings—an
event that heightened concern regarding the otherwise innocuous and mundane tool. Furthermore,
the other items of concern in Adam’s backpack were common to many teenagers. If every high
school student possessing a fake I.D. was expelled, school overcrowding would be solved overnight.
Nevertheless, school administrators clung to these otherwise insignificant discoveries in the attempt
to justify their decision. Id.
7. Id. at 612.
8. Id. at 620.
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the initial events and the Fifth Circuit’s decision, school administrators
forced Adam, under threat of expulsion, to enroll in a school for troubled
students; he subsequently dropped out.9 By the time the constitutional
dust settled, it was too late for Adam Porter. The courts may have finally
vindicated him, but his high school experience was by then just a
memory.
School violence across the nation has created an atmosphere of fear,
leaving administrators desperately searching for warning signs similar to
those exhibited by past school shooters.10 Caution is warranted,11 and
administrators must be empowered to act when they perceive that a
danger exists,12 for history shows that unaddressed or unrecognized
warning signs can transform into tragedy.13 But it is also important that
9. Id. at 612. Had Adam Porter originally drawn the sketch on school premises or instructed
his brother to take it on campus, the outcome of the First Amendment analysis likely would have
been very different. See id. at 617–20. Since the sketch was drawn off campus and never
intentionally communicated, however, the court found that it was “outside the school” expression,
was not a true threat, and consequently warranted First Amendment protection. Id. at 620.
Unfortunately, that finding came several years after the events transpired and was largely a
meaningless victory: Adam Porter’s high school career had long since ended, and the principal who
initiated the actions against him was shielded by qualified immunity. See id. at 611–12.
10. According to the Center for Disease Control, it is crucial that schools improve safety by
“watching for signals that precede violent outbursts, paying close attention to threats, and learning to
recognize and respond to bullying behavior.” Press Release, United States Department of Education,
Violent
Deaths
In
or
Near
Schools
Are
Rare
(Dec.
4,
2001),
http://www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2001/12/12042001.html. Over fifty percent of the incidents of
school violence the CDC studied were preceded by signals such as “a note, threat, journal entry, or
other action.” Mark Anderson et al., School-Associated Violent Deaths in the United States, 1994–
1999, 2001 JAMA 2695, 2701; see also Tyson Lewis, The Surveillance Economy of Post-Columbine
Schools, 25 REV. EDUC. PEDAGOGY & CULT. STUD. 335 (2003) (discussing the various security
changes implemented in schools in response to Columbine). As an example of signs exhibited before
the Red Lake shootings, shooter Jeffrey Weise made numerous postings to neo-Nazi websites and
expressed an obsession with school shootings. Heron Marquez Estrada et al., An Internet Trail of a
STAR
TRIB.,
Mar.
24,
2005,
available
at
Boy’s
Death
Wish,
MINN.
http://www.startribune.com/stories/462/5310301.html.
11. See generally Joseph Lintott, Note, Teaching and Learning in the Face of School
Violence, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 553 (2004).
12. Preventing school violence is undoubtedly a compelling interest. Preventing
administrators from responding to threats to safety in the interest of students’ First Amendment
rights, which would essentially put unnecessary obstacles in administrators’ paths, would be both
counterproductive (school violence is at least as damaging to student freedom as administrator
action) and irresponsible. This Comment endeavors to reach a solution that permits educators to
insulate their schools against violence without further eroding speech rights.
13. Most recently, on March 21, 2005, sixteen-year-old Jeffrey Weise murdered his
grandfather and another adult and then opened fire on his classmates at Red Lake High School in
Minnesota, killing five students, a teacher, and a security guard and injuring several others. School
Gunman Stole Police Pistol, Vest, CNN, Mar. 23, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/
US/03/22/school.shooting/index.html. Before the shooting rampage at Red Lake High School,
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in the rush to prevent future violence administrators do not unnecessarily
trample upon students’ First Amendment speech rights.14
Since Columbine15 and the school shootings that preceded and
followed it,16 courts addressing First Amendment protection on the
Jeffrey Weise posted online a disturbing violent flash animation depicting a shooting. See School
Killer’s
Animated
Terror,
THE
SMOKING
GUN,
http://www.thesmokinggun.com/
archive/0323051weise1.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2005). Further, his personal website included video
captures from “Elephant,” a film about a school shooting. Id.
14. See David L. Hudson, Jr. & John E. Ferguson, Jr., The Courts’ Inconsistent Treatment of
Bethel v. Fraser and the Curtailment of Student Rights, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 181, 181 (2002)
(The “movement toward increasing censorship by school officials has only escalated after a series of
school shootings, culminating in the tragedy at Columbine High School.”); Robert D. Richards &
Clay Calvert, Columbine Fallout: The Long-Term Effects on Free Expression Take Hold in Public
Schools, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (2003) (“[T]he events at Columbine gave high school
administrators all the reasons—legitimate or illegitimate—they needed to trounce the First
Amendment rights of public school students in the name of preventing violence.”).
15. Eric Harris, eighteen, and Dylan Klebold, seventeen, stormed their high school,
murdering a dozen classmates and a teacher and injuring twenty-three others. Students Triumphant
in Taking Back Columbine High, CNN, Aug. 16, 1999, http://www.cnn.com/
US/9908/16/columbine.shooting.06/index.html; see also Tom Kentworthy, Up to 25 Die in
Colorado School Shooting, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1999, at A1 (describing “a shooting rampage on a
scale unprecedented in an American school”); Dave Cullen, Inside the Columbine High
Investigation, SALON, Sept. 23, 1999, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/1999/09/23/
columbine/index.html.
16. Between 1996 and 2003, school shootings occurred in (chronologically listed and not
comprehensive): Moses Lake, Washington (A fourteen-year-old shot a teacher and two students with
a rifle.); Bethel, Alaska (A sixteen-year-old shot and killed his principal and a student, and two other
students were injured.); Pearl, Mississippi (A sixteen-year-old killed his mother, then went to school
and shot nine others; two died.); West Paducah, Kentucky (A fourteen-year-old shot eight students
as they prayed in school; three died and one student was left paralyzed.); Stamps, Arkansas (An
eighth-grader was arrested and charged as an adult after he confessed to shooting and wounding two
of his fellow students as he hid in the woods outside of a high school.); Jonesboro, Arkansas (Two
boys, ages eleven and thirteen, shot fourteen students and one teacher; the teacher and four of the
students died.); Edinboro, Pennsylvania (A fourteen-year-old student shot a teacher to death at a
graduation dance.); Pomona, California (A fourteen-year-old shot three boys; two died.);
Fayettesville, Tennessee (An eighteen-year-old shot and killed a classmate just three days before
graduation.); Springfield, Oregon (A fifteen-year-old shot and killed both parents before he went to
school and opened fire in the cafeteria; two students were killed.); Columbia, South Carolina (A
fourteen-year-old student was arrested after a school shooting that wounded a teacher and an elderly
volunteer aid.); Richmond, Virginia (A fourteen-year-old student was charged as an adult for
opening fire in a crowded high school hallway, wounding a teacher and a volunteer.); Conyers,
Georgia (A fifteen-year-old wounded six classmates.); Fort Gibson, Oklahoma (A seventh-grader
brought a handgun to school and opened fire; four students were wounded.); Lake Worth, Florida (A
thirteen-year-old sent home from school returned with a handgun and killed a teacher.); Glendale,
Arizona (A teenager held a teacher and thirty-two students hostage for an hour before surrendering.);
Oxnard, California (A seventeen-year-old entered a school and took a girl hostage in an attempt to
persuade police to shoot him; after the SWAT team arrived, he was shot dead.); Santee, California
(A fifteen-year-old opened fire from inside a school bathroom, shooting fifteen and killing two.); El
Cajon, California (Gunman injured three teens and two teachers at Granite Hills High School.); New
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campuses of public schools17 have repeatedly held that “[a] school need
not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic educational
mission, even though the government could not censor similar speech
outside the school.”18 A student’s freedom of speech “in” school is less
than his freedom of speech at home, work, a shopping mall, a movie
theater, or virtually anywhere else “out” of school.19 However, the line
designating what constitutes out-of-school speech is jagged with
exceptions and caveats.20 In the absence of clear bright-line rules to
York, New York (A teenager wounded two students at Martin Luther King Jr. High School.); Dallas,
Texas (A fifteen-year-old male high school student was shot as he and fellow students tried to
wrestle a gun away from another fourteen-year-old student.); Seattle, Washington (A thirteen-yearold male fired a rifle in a middle school, injuring two students with broken glass, and then used the
gun to kill himself.); Westminster, Colorado (A fourteen-year-old male freshman was taken into
custody after several shots were fired in a high school courtyard.); Red Lion, Pennsylvania (A
fourteen-year-old male junior high school student shot and killed his principal inside a crowded
cafeteria and then killed himself with a second gun according to police.); Cold Spring, Minnesota
(One student died and another was hospitalized after a shooting in a Minnesota high school; a
teacher talked the student into surrendering.). Sch. Violence Res. Ctr., Nat’l Ctr. for Rural Law
Enforcement,
School
Shootings
Map
and
Descriptions
from
1996–2003,
http://www.svrc.net/ShootingsMap.htm#Fort%20Gibson (last visited Nov. 3, 2005).
17. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (upholding regulation of
student speech that is related to school-sponsored activities); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675 (1986) (upholding regulation of student speech that is lewd, vulgar, obscene, or plainly
offensive); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (prohibiting
viewpoint-specific regulations unless the regulated speech substantially interferes with the work of
the school); Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding school
regulations that further substantial government interests unrelated to the suppression of student
expression).
18. See, e.g., Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266 (citations omitted).
19. The Supreme Court has not specified how much authority a public school can assert over
off-campus student expression, but it is a logical inference that when students are not in school, they
are not students but, rather, general citizens. Consequently, they are governed by general principles
of First Amendment jurisprudence, which does not distinguish between adults and minors. See Clay
Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship of the Emerging Internet
Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 271 (2001).
20. Specifically, questions loom regarding how to classify speech made or composed off
campus and subsequently brought to campus by a third party. Many courts have ruled that
expressions created off campus, and then intentionally brought on campus, or even intentionally
communicated and subsequently brought on campus, are treated as in-school expression. See Doe v.
Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 619–20, 627 (8th Cir. 2002) (upholding
punishment of student for writing threatening letters later brought on campus by a friend without
authorization from the student); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001)
(allowing expulsion of student on emergency basis for bringing on campus a violent poem that he
had written off campus); Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 822–23, 827–28 (7th Cir. 1998)
(disciplining student for an article printed in an underground newspaper that was distributed on
campus); Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1072, 1075–77 (5th Cir. 1973)
(upholding punishment of student for authoring article printed in underground newspaper distributed
off campus but near school grounds). However, other courts have held that off-campus speech is
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follow, teachers and administrators sometimes react out of fear and
suppress speech that, in retrospect, should be protected. Additionally, the
traditional legal framework for assessing threats is overinclusive21 when
dealing with student speech, overreacting to harmless speech and thus
being spread so thin as to be unable to respond to legitimate dangers.
Further, fearing punishment, many students choose to suppress their
speech, thus concealing potential warning signs. As Columbine, Red
Lake, and other tragedies have demonstrated, and as future tragedies may
demonstrate, speech can be infringed, but violence is likely to continue.
With greater student speech, a student contemplating violence will be
more likely to express his feelings. Warning signs will surface and, with
the appropriate guidelines in place, these signs can be dealt with. A
danger known is much safer than a danger that goes unspoken until it is
too late. In this regard, encouraging the open exchange of student speech
is as vital to school safety as it is to First Amendment rights.
This Comment proposes two needed clarifications to balance
educators’ rights to maintain a secure environment and students’ rights to
express themselves by viewing school administrators’ evaluations of
student threats and warning signs as a two-step process: (1) use of a clear
standard to determine whether student speech is within their jurisdiction
(the on-campus/off-campus question),22 and if so, (2) determination if
student speech actually threatens school safety through application of
specific guidelines modeled after those proposed by the United States

entitled to full First Amendment protection even when it makes its way onto school grounds without
the assistance of the speaker. See Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619 (5th Cir.
2004) (noting that some courts “have found that off-campus speech is entitled to full First
Amendment protection even when it makes its way onto school grounds”), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
2530 (2005); Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that the limited
abrogation of First Amendment rights is out of place with regard to off-campus speech); see also
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that a student punished for lewd
comments made during a school-sponsored debate could not be punished had he “given the same
speech outside of the school environment . . . simply because government officials considered his
language to be inappropriate.”); Richards & Calvert, supra note 14, at 1116–20 (challenging the
jurisdiction of administrators over student speech occurring off campus and subsequently brought on
campus by a third party without the communicator’s permission).
21. It is overinclusive in the sense that it produces false warning signs for student speech,
which though unsavory or even violent, ultimately poses little or no real danger to school safety.
22. Of course, not all off-campus, out-of-school speech—such as threats—is fully protected.
However, the presumption in dealing with out-of-school speech, generally, is that it is fully protected
and the burden, then, is to show that the speech in question represents an exception—such as threats
or obscenity.
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Secret Service.23 Contrary to what many assume, greater speech rights
for students and safer schools are complementary objectives, rather than
mutually exclusive goals. By delineating clear boundaries for school
authorities regarding permissible and restricted speech, thereby affording
greater freedom to student speech, schools will attain a greater degree of
security than is otherwise possible since the free flow of student speech
will likely include warning signs that would otherwise go unspoken or
remain underground for fear of punishment.
Part II.A of this Comment discusses the foundational case law
established by the Supreme Court and circuit courts with regard to
limited speech rights in public schools. Part II.B explores selected circuit
and district court decisions addressing the on-campus/off-campus, inschool/out-of-school distinction—an important threshold distinction in
determining if a school has jurisdiction. Part III analyzes (a) the failure
of the traditional threat analysis in the student context, (b) the troubling
changes that public schools have undertaken in response to school
violence and the significance of warning signs, as attested to by past
shootings, and (c) guidelines that have been proposed to determine when
a danger truly exists. Part IV proposes two modifications to the current
law and procedure regarding student speech that will serve to heighten
school safety while protecting student speech rights: (a) bright line rules
to distinguish on- and off-campus speech, and (b) effective guidelines to
evaluate when a threat exists. This proposed balance includes
acknowledging the difference between a threat—as defined purely in
terms of speech—and a warning sign, and responding appropriately. Part
IV.C briefly sets forth the safety benefits of these proposals, and Part V
offers a brief conclusion.
II. THE EVOLUTION AND CONFUSION OF
ON-CAMPUS, IN-SCHOOL SPEECH
A. Foundational Cases: Diminished Protection on Campus
The freedom of speech afforded to students on campus (or when
attending a school-sponsored activity away from campus) is perhaps best
described as an abbreviated version of the freedom of speech society
23. See, e.g., ROBERT A. FEIN ET AL., U.S. SECRET SERV. & U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., THREAT
ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS: A GUIDE TO MANAGING THREATENING SITUATIONS AND TO CREATING
SAFE
SCHOOL
CLIMATES
(2002),
available
at
http://www.secretservice.gov/
ntac/ssi_guide.pdf.
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typically enjoys.24 This Section discusses the cases that have shaped the
jurisprudence regarding student speech. While courts vary in referring to
“on-campus” speech and “in-school” speech, the two are virtually
synonymous for the purposes of this Comment: essentially, the school
campus expands for free-speech purposes to include any schoolsponsored activities, such as athletic events, even where the physical
location would otherwise be deemed “off-campus.”
Initially, courts recognized broad speech rights for students when off
the school campus. Subsequent decisions, however, expanded the
definition of “on-campus” and considerably eroded speech rights
whenever the speech is construed as potentially causing a substantial
disruption on campus—an elastic concept than can be stretched to
include virtually any unpopular speech. Without a clear, firm test for
what can potentially cause “substantial disruption,” virtually any offcampus expression may be characterized and legally defined as oncampus expression.
The landmark case establishing the concept of on-campus speech25
as a reduced form of traditional speech is Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District.26 Three students planned to
protest the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to school,
prompting administrators to adopt a policy forbidding the armbands with
the threat of suspension.27 While overturning the school’s policy, the
Supreme Court famously declared that students do not “shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.”28 Despite that emphatic statement, the Court did
indeed limit students’ rights by holding that First Amendment protection
does not extend to speech that materially disrupts class work or involves

24. “We have . . . recognized that the First Amendment rights of students in the public
schools ‘are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings’ . . . .”
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). For a discussion of the abbreviated First Amendment rights of students,
see generally Leonard M. Niehoff, The Student’s Right to Freedom of Speech: How Much is Left at
the Schoolhouse Gate?, 75 MICH. B.J. 1150 (1996).
25. On-campus speech, for purposes of this Comment, encompasses school sponsored field
trips, transportation, athletic events, and performances, in which the school’s campus virtually
travels with the student under the auspices of school sponsorship. The question this Comment
grapples with is, instead, the rarer cases where the speech itself may drift into the school’s domain
without the knowledge or desire of the student speaker.
26. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
27. Id. at 504.
28. Id. at 506.

1377

5SALGADO.FIN.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/21/2006 4:56:41 PM

[2005

substantial disorder.29 In short, students do not shed their constitutional
rights at the schoolhouse gate, with an added and very large caveat:
“unless their speech causes disruption.”
Alone, Tinker seems to hold that students’ rights are fully protected
unless school authorities reasonably believe that the student’s expression
will “substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon
the rights of other students.”30 However, subsequent cases have
continued to chip away at the First Amendment’s presence in schools by
broadening the definition of what constitutes a free-speech exempted
interruption. Bethel School District v. Fraser added another exception to
students’ speech rights in holding that schools can prohibit the use of
vulgar and offensive language if the speech is inconsistent with the
school’s basic educational mission.31 Two years later, Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier added yet another exception by holding that
otherwise protected student speech can be regulated if it arises in the
context of school-sponsored activities32 and the school’s censorship is
“reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”33 This logic can
be extended to encompass activities that, while technically “off campus,”
are nevertheless “in-school” activities, such as athletic events, field trips,
and school bus rides home.
Most recently, in Canady v. Bossier Parish School Board,34 the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals limited the Tinker analysis as pertaining only to
specific viewpoint regulation—those instances where a particular
viewpoint is suppressed while other viewpoints go unchecked.35 Under
29. Id. at 509 & n.3.
30. Id. at 509; see also Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
31. 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). In Fraser, a high school student delivered a speech containing
offensive and vulgar sexual innuendos during a school assembly. Id. at 677–78. The Supreme Court
held for the school district, finding that the vulgar speech could be prohibited. Id. at 683.
32. 484 U.S. 260, 262–64 (1988) (The activity was a school newspaper.).
33. Id. at 273. In Kuhlmeier, the school newspaper was publishing articles that dealt with
teen pregnancy and the effect of divorce on students. Id. at 263. The principal of the school objected
to this content and removed the pages dealing with that material—consequently removing other
stories as well. Id. at 263–64 & n.1. The Court upheld the principal’s actions. Id. at 273.
34. 240 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2001). In Canady, parents brought an action challenging a
mandatory uniform policy imposed on all public schools within the district. Id. at 439.
35. Id. at 442 (“[Tinker] involves school regulations directed at specific student
viewpoints.”). Finding the Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier tests ill-suited to the case before it, the
court adopted another test for generally applicable, viewpoint-neutral regulation, which indirectly
suppresses speech on school campuses: an adaptation of the time, place, and manner analysis and the
similar test outlined in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), to a school setting.
Canady, 240 F.3d at 442–43. Specifically, viewpoint regulation occurs when speech is suppressed
not because of the general subject matter, but because of the specific viewpoint taken by the speaker;
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Canady, a school policy regulating student speech—specifically their
manner of dress while on a school’s campus—survives constitutional
scrutiny if (1) “it furthers an important or substantial government
interest;” (2) “the interest is unrelated to the suppression of student
expression;” and (3) “the incidental restrictions on First Amendment
activities are no more than is necessary to facilitate that interest.”36
A common denominator among these cases is the “in-school”
component, whether on campus,37 at an assembly or extra-curricular
activity,38 or in the school newspaper.39 No Supreme Court case clearly
answers whether a school can punish student speech that occurs off
campus and away from a school-sponsored activity.40 However, lower
courts41 and commentators42 have suggested that student speech
occurring off campus, without school affiliation, should be treated the
same as any other fully protected speech since the First Amendment does
not discriminate between young adults and adults.43 If off-campus and
out-of-school speech are entitled to the protection of the First
Amendment—and there is no reason to think otherwise—the operative
question becomes: what is “off-campus” or “out-of-school” speech? As
the body of case law44 addressing that question demonstrates, the answer
is not clear.

for example, allowing speech about the war in Iraq, but singling out and suppressing any speech that
expressly opposes the fighting.
36. Canady, 240 F.3d at 443. Such an analysis is very similar to the content-neutral analysis
that would be applied in a traditional First Amendment context, interpreting the Canady test’s third
prong as analogous to narrow tailoring and the school as the government regulator. However, the
Canady court gave little attention to whether this was the least restrictive alternative and if it was
sufficiently narrowly tailored—important prongs in the non-school analysis. For example, in
Schneider v. New Jersey the Court held that an anti-leafletting ordinance meant to prevent littering
could be replaced by a ban on littering, which would be just as effective. 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939).
37. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503; Canady, 240 F.3d 437.
38. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
39. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273.
40. Leora Harpaz, Internet Speech and the First Amendment Rights of Public School
Students, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 123, 142. However, it seems logical that schools can take an
interest in the welfare of students away from the school. This is an important distinction explored
more in Part IV as an alternative to punishment.
41. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050, 1052 (2d Cir. 1979).
42. See, e.g., Calvert, supra note 19, at 271; David L. Hudson, Jr., Censorship of Student
Internet Speech: The Effect of Diminishing Student Rights, Fear of the Internet and Columbine, 2000
MICH. ST. L. REV. 199, 222.
43. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
44. See infra Part II.B.
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B. Where the Schoolhouse Gates End: The “In-School”
and “Out-of-School” Distinction
A preliminary step in any school-speech analysis is determining
whether the school actually possesses jurisdiction regarding the speech.
This question hinges on whether or not the speech occurred on campus.
This section discusses the development of and current confusion
regarding this distinction.
1. The development of the distinction
A significant danger of wrongly classifying “out-of-school” speech
as “in-school” speech is that out-of-school speech is subsequently
stripped of many of the First Amendment protections it rightfully
deserves. In Thomas v. Board of Education, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit emphatically held that speech occurring off campus is
beyond the reach of school officials: “[O]ur willingness to defer to the
schoolmaster’s expertise in administering school discipline rests, in large
measure, upon the supposition that the arm of authority does not reach
beyond the schoolhouse gate.”45 The school in Thomas suspended
students for publishing and distributing a magazine off campus that
contained sexually graphic material.46 The court reasoned that since
school officials “ventured out of the school yard and into the general
community where the freedom accorded expression is at its zenith, their
actions must be evaluated by the principles that bind government
officials in the public arena.”47 In short, the magazine was purely offcampus speech, and the court held that a “student is free to speak his
mind when the school day ends.”48 But in Thomas, the court’s decision
was made easier because none of the magazines actually reached
campus; when speech created off campus is intentionally or
unintentionally brought on campus,49 the on-campus/off-campus
distinction is blurred.50 On one hand, the speech was born well outside

45. 607 F.2d at 1044–45.
46. Id. at 1045–46 & n.3.
47. Id. at 1050.
48. Id. at 1052. This idea is echoed by the Canady court which emphasized that students
could wear attire of their own choice when away from school. Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd.,
240 F.3d 437, 443 (5th Cir. 2001).
49. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
50. Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 618–19 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
125 S. Ct. 2530 (2005).
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school premises—suggesting it is off-campus speech; on the other hand,
the speech subsequently enters the school’s domain. At that point, does
the fundamental classification of the speech shift from off-campus
speech to on-campus speech?
Many courts have applied standards developed in Tinker and its
progeny to evaluate off-campus student speech subsequently brought on
campus by someone other than the speaker.51 Such cases have involved
“underground” student newspapers distributed off campus,52 student-run
Web sites created using off-campus computers,53 and writings brought
on campus by students other than the original author.54 The similarity in
each of these cases is that the student’s expression was brought on
campus as a direct consequence of his desire to communicate that
expression to someone who then brought it on campus.55 For example, in
Boucher v. School Board, an underground newspaper was distributed on
campus,56 and in Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District, a
paper was distributed off campus but in very close proximity to the
school.57 An “on-campus” finding makes sense in both cases since the
speaker clearly meant for his speech to be disseminated among the
student body on school grounds.
In contrast, communication that was never actually brought to
campus, or was brought to campus inadvertently without intent to
communicate it, has generally been held to be off-campus speech and
afforded full First Amendment protection.58 In Porter v. Ascension
Parish School Board, for example, Adam Porter showed his violent
drawing of the school under siege only to family and a friend at home,
and it was only by chance that his brother unwittingly took it on

51. Id. at 619.
52. See Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 822, 827–28 (7th Cir. 1998); Sullivan v. Houston
Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1072, 1075–76 (5th Cir. 1973); Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist.,
462 F.2d 960, 964, 970–75 (5th Cir. 1972); Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 686 F. Supp. 1387, 1389,
1392 (D. Minn. 1987).
53. See Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000); Beussink
v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177, 1180–82 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
54. See Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 619–20 (8th Cir. 2002);
Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448–49, 455 (W.D. Penn. 2001).
55. See supra notes 52–54.
56. 134 F.3d at 822–23.
57. 475 F.2d 1071, 1074 (5th Cir. 1973).
58. See Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125
S. Ct. 2530 (2005); Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1044 (2d Cir. 1979); Klein v. Smith,
635 F. Supp. 1440 (D. Me. 1986).
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campus.59 The court held that the situation in Porter was off-campus
expression.60 In Klein v. Smith, a student gave “the finger” to his teacher
in the parking lot of a restaurant while both were away from campus.61
Again, the court held that it was off-campus expression.62
2. The problems inherent to the current distinction
The cases discussed above suggest an obvious distinction between
on-campus and off-campus speech: if the speech is made on campus or
brought to campus according to the will of the speaker, it is on-campus
speech and, thus, is afforded a lower level of free-speech protection.63
Unfortunately, no such bright-line rule actually exists. Many of the
courts finding speech made off campus and later brought on campus to
be on-campus speech have relied on the concept of off-campus speech
producing on-campus effects rather than emphasizing whether the
student intended that speech to actually reach campus.64 Indeed, even in
its broad defense of off-campus speech, the Second Circuit in Thomas v.
Board of Education left open the possibility that school administrators
could punish students who “incite[] substantial disruption within the
school from some remote locale.”65 Less clear, however, is whether
speech actually needs to make it on campus to “incite substantial
disruption”66 or whether speech that remains entirely off campus, but

59. Porter, 393 F.3d at 615.
60. Id.
61. 635 F. Supp. at 1441.
62. Id. Klein’s expression was not in a fixed form and could not be subsequently brought
onto campus, rendering the on-campus/off-campus distinction clearer than in the cases where an
expression originates off campus yet eventually finds its way on campus. Unless photographed or
otherwise recorded, making an obscene gesture—as he did—is not fixed in a transportable medium.
63. One could also reasonably add “speech relating to a class assignment” to this category.
For example, if one student in a class takes a test early for personal reasons and later tells other
students (while off campus) what is on the exam before they have taken it, a school could
presumably discipline the student for that speech. Such speech directly undermines the core purposes
of the school.
64. See Calvert, supra note 19, at 248–49.
65. 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 & n.17 (2d Cir. 1979). It seems implicit in the rule that such
incitement would be accompanied by intentional communication by the speaker.
66. Many of the school shootings that have occurred suggest scenarios in which off-campus
speech may indeed cause on-campus disruption, particularly communication plotting or encouraging
school shootings. However, as we shall see in the later discussion, this can be analyzed best under
true threat analysis.
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affects students who themselves go on campus, falls under this
umbrella.67
Given the duty of administrators to prevent disturbances,68 Tinker
allows school officials to act before disruption actually occurs.69 Since
forecasting such disruption in advance is unmistakably difficult to do,
Tinker does not require certainty that disruption will occur. Instead, the
existence of “facts which might reasonably lead school officials to
forecast substantial disruption” is sufficient.70 In the aftermath of
Columbine, Red Lake, and other school shootings, much of what nervous
educators perceive as potentially inciting “substantial disruption” may
actually be harmless (while students posing a legitimate safety danger
will conceal their speech or remain silent for fear of punishment).71
Virtually anything can now set off warning lights—educators treat a
satirical website parodying school administration72 the same way they
treat a legitimate danger. Consequently, without a clear test for what can
potentially cause “substantial disruption,” virtually any off-campus
expression may be characterized and legally defined as on-campus
expression.
Such a categorization is potentially overinclusive, and courts
disagree about what to treat as on campus.73 For example, in Emmett v.
Kent School District, the federal district court held that a Web site
created off campus—even though the intended audience was
undoubtedly connected to the high school—was “entirely outside of the
school’s supervision or control.”74 Less than a year later, however, in
Killion v. Franklin Regional School District, another district court
rendered a decision incongruous with the others.75 A student composed
and distributed to his friends via email a top-ten list critical of a

67. An example of such speech might be the scenario discussed in footnote 63, where a
student shares information about an exam.
68. See generally Alison Bethel, Keeping Schools Safe: Why Schools Should Have an
Affirmative Duty To Protect Students from Harm by Other Students, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 183 (2004)
(discussing duty to prevent school violence wherever possible); see also infra Part II.D.
69. Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Karp v.
Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 175 (9th Cir. 1973)).
70. Karp, 477 F.2d at 175 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 514 (1969)).
71. See discussion on post-Columbine paranoia infra Part III.
72. Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
73. See infra notes 74–78 and accompanying text.
74. 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1090.
75. 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
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teacher.76 The court examined the list under the Tinker analysis since
“the overwhelming weight of authority” had examined such speech
under Tinker, and because the list “was brought on campus, albeit by an
unknown person.”77
Given the uncertainty among the courts as to whether the speaker
must actually intend for the speech to make it onto campus—the
students’ actions in Emmett and Killion were virtually identical, but with
contrasting outcomes—administrators lack clear guidance in determining
what speech falls within their jurisdiction.78 In the absence of clear, easyto-follow guidelines, complete suppression of student speech unpopular
with educators becomes the default. Troubled students, deprived of any
acceptable outline to vent their frustrations, could hide their feelings,
which could possibly lead to violence. The problem of ascertaining
where a school’s jurisdiction begins and ends is further exacerbated by
the prevalent approach for evaluating potentially violent student speech:
relying on traditional legal threat analysis and a general response
procedure that favors punishment and suppression over help and
encouragement.
III. THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL THREAT ANALYSIS AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF WARNING SIGNS AND GUIDELINES TO EVALUATE
WHEN A DANGER ACTUALLY EXISTS
Providing for school safety is, in some ways, a complex dance: on
the one hand, it is necessary to allow enough freedom of speech to
students so that they can express themselves adequately; on the other
hand, however, it is critical that educators respond appropriately when
warning signs suggest potential danger is on the horizon. Once the initial
question of whether or not the school possesses jurisdiction is answered,
the speech must be analyzed to determine if a danger exists. This Section
discusses (A) traditional threat analysis—based on the intent and
expectation of causing fear—and why such analysis is ineffective and
overinclusive in addressing adolescent speech, (B) the important role of
warning signs and the danger posed by zero-tolerance policies, and (C)
guidelines developed to help determine when a legitimate danger exists.
76. Id. at 448–49.
77. Id. at 455.
78. Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619–20 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
125 S. Ct. 2530 (2005). Clearly, off-campus speech must be dealt with differently than on-campus
speech. However, if administrators have no certain way of distinguishing between the two types,
they will likely treat all speech as on-campus speech under the “substantial disruption” theory.
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A. The Failure of Traditional Threat Analysis in the School Context
In free-speech jurisprudence, various categories of unprotected
speech exist, including incitement,79 false statements of fact,80
obscenity,81 child pornography,82 fighting words,83 and threats.84
“Threat” analysis is generally employed to determine whether student
speech can be suppressed, but the very undertaking of such an analysis is
rife with error. The traditional legal framework is designed around adult
speech and does not accommodate adolescent speech. Consequently, it
singles out speech that might be harmless (over-inclusiveness) while
failing to include speech that, though falling short of a legal “threat”
classification, provides warning signs of potential violence85 and
urgently needs to be dealt with (under-inclusiveness). This Comment
contends that in cases of adolescent speech, it is necessary to supplant
the traditional legal threat analysis with guidelines that accommodate the
unique characteristics of youth. Instead of seeking a legal analysis to
determine what speech can be punished, educators need to apply a
qualitative analysis to determine which students need help.
In order to demonstrate the inadequacy of the traditional threat
analysis, it is necessary first to explain the fundamentals of that analysis
and how it has been applied—ineffectively—to adolescent speech.
1. Fundamentals of threat analysis
A genuine threat is not protected speech under the First
Amendment.86 Exactly what constitutes a genuine threat, however, as
opposed to a harmless expression of frustration or anger, is a difficult

79. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
80. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
81. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
82. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
83. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571–72 (1942).
84. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Watts v. United States, 394
U.S. 705 (1969).
85. For example, before the shooting rampage at Red Lake High School, sixteen-year-old
Jeffrey Weise posted online a disturbing violent flash animation depicting a shooting. See School
Killer’s Animated Terror, supra note 13. The flash animation would not satisfy any of the required
prongs to be a threat, yet was nevertheless a very legitimate warning sign, which should have
triggered a response.
86. Watts, 394 U.S. at 707–08.
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distinction.87 According to Watts v. United States, the threat must be a
realistic, actual threat and not mere hyperbole.88 In Watts, a protester
declared that if the military made him “carry a rifle the first man [he]
want[ed] to get in [his] sights [was] L.B.J.”89 Emphasizing the unique
language of the political arena, the Supreme Court held that such an
announcement amounted to no more than hyperbole90 and, consequently,
was protected speech outside the threat category.91 The Court did not
provide a more comprehensive definition of what a true threat92 is until
Virginia v. Black in 2003.93
Addressing threat doctrine in the context of cross burning, the Black
Court defined true threats as encompassing “those statements where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of
individuals.”94 However, the Court noted that actual intent to carry out
the threat is not required.95 The only intent necessary is the “intent of
placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”96 As an initial
threshold, the speaker must intend to convey the purported threat; the

87. This is especially true for school administrators unversed in the intricacies of First
Amendment law.
88. Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
89. Id. at 706.
90. As will be shown in subsequent analysis, just as the Court afforded particular
consideration to hyperbole given the nature of the political arena, it would make sense to afford
similar consideration to hyperbole given the nature of youthful communications.
91. Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
92. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 283, 294–95 (2001); Lisa M. Pisciotta, Comment, Beyond Sticks & Stones: A First
Amendment Framework for Educators Who Seek To Punish Student Threats, 30 SETON HALL L.
REV. 635, 642–43 (2000).
93. 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003).
94. Id. at 359.
95. Id. at 359–60 (“The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat.”).
96. Id. at 360. Watts, with its exception for hyperbolic speech, assumes that hyperbolic
speech is not intended to place the recipient in any such fear and does not have that effect on the
recipient. This is a somewhat dubious distinction since the mere fact that speech is hyperbolic does
not exonerate it from causing fear on the part of the recipient: “I’m going to rip your head off and
gut you” certainly is no less fear-inducing than a less-hyperbolic “I’m going to inflict physical harm
upon you.” If anything, the hyperbolic speech will likely engender greater fear than more sedate
expression. More likely, what the Court means, in distinguishing hyperbolic speech from other
threats, is to exclude those instances in which the speaker has no intent to cause harm or even fear
thereof, but speaks in terms that might be so construed if taken out of context. Context, in fact, is
crucial: The phrase “I’m going to kill him,” has very different meanings when spoken by an
employee engaged in good natured pranks with a friend, than when uttered by a laid-off employee
and directed towards the boss who decided his fate.
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lack of intent to communicate the threat destroys the threat classification
and renders the communication fully protected under the First
Amendment.97
Unfortunately, Black failed to resolve a divide among the circuits
regarding how best to parse true threats from protected speech once the
threshold question of whether the speaker intended to communicate the
speech is met.98 Courts typically adopt an objective test focusing on
whether a reasonable person would interpret the purported threat as a
serious expression of intent to cause a present or future harm.99 The
courts disagree, however, as to the person from whose viewpoint the
statement should be interpreted:100 a reasonable person standing in the
shoes of the speaker,101 or a reasonable person standing in the shoes of
the recipient.102
In United States v. Dinwiddie,103 the Eighth Circuit, adhering to the
reasonable recipient standard, set forth a list of factors regarding how a
reasonable recipient would view a purported threat: (1) the reaction of
those who heard the alleged threat; (2) whether the threat was
conditional; (3) whether the person who made the threat communicated it
directly to the object of the threat; (4) whether the speaker had a history
of making threats against the person purportedly threatened; and (5)
whether the recipient had a reason to believe that the speaker had a
propensity to engage in violence.104 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has
adhered to the reasonable speaker standard in defining a true threat test
as “whether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would
be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement
as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault.”105

97. Id. at 359.
98. Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2002).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290
F.3d 1058, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
102. United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1994).
103. 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996).
104. Id. at 925.
105. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting United
States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990)).
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2. Struggles in applying the analysis to adolescent speech
Initially it makes sense, particularly in the school context, to follow
the reasonable speaker approach given the risk that a speaker’s
constitutional rights may otherwise “turn on a recipient’s unique
sensitivity or characteristic that is, or may be, unknown to the
speaker.”106 What defines a “reasonable recipient” in the educational
context is debatable,107 and it would be difficult for a student to know
whether a given teacher or administration is particularly prone to fear of
school violence. An excellent illustration of this concept is found in
LaVine v. Blaine School District.108
In the summer before his junior year of high school, James LaVine
wrote a poem, “Last Words,” which was a first-person account of a
violent high school shooting.109 He showed the poem to his mother who
warned him not to show it to any teachers because they might
overreact.110 James failed to heed his mother’s advice, and several
months later he showed the poem to his English teacher and asked her
opinion.111 Alarmed, she contacted a school counselor and set into
motion a chain of events leading to James’s emergency expulsion from
school.112
The quick and decisive reaction by the administration to what, in
retrospect, posed no actual danger demonstrates the problems of using a
reasonable recipient standard in the school context.113 Had the court

106. Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 623 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing
United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997)). However, applying the reasonable
speaker test requires ascertaining the mindset of a reasonable teenager. Such a requirement may be
difficult for courts: need the student take into consideration the heightened scrutiny of educators due
to school shootings and violence? If so, might that produce self-censorship and a chilling effect on
student speech?
107. The definition would hinge on various factors such as recent violence and the perceived
threat, in general, to the school’s safety.
108. 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001). It is noteworthy that the events leading to this case
occurred before Columbine, but after the series of school shootings that began putting administrators
on edge.
109. Id. at 983–84.
110. Id. at 984.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 984–87.
113. Admittedly, even if the school wrongly perceived it as a threat, that serves only to show
that some school administrators are not reasonable in their reactions to speech of this sort. However,
this occurrence does serve to underscore the difficulty in determining what actually constitutes a
“reasonable recipient.” Some may argue that knowing that they could get kicked out of school for
poems that could be perceived as threatening school violence could persuade students to avoid that
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based its determination entirely upon the recipient’s reaction, the speech
would have been deemed a threat. It also acknowledged, however, the
necessary discretion afforded to administrators in responding quickly
given the grave danger that a slower response may create.114
Admittedly, the reasonable speaker standard is potentially
problematic as well—what exactly is a reasonable teenager, if such a
thing even exists? Must a “reasonable teenage speaker” take into
consideration the potential overreaction of educators, as James LaVine’s
mother suggested when she warned him to not show his work to any
teachers? If so, would this trigger undue self-censorship and a chilling
effect on student speech? Topics susceptible to hypersensitivity in
schools, such as death or conflict, are subjects that have been addressed
in art and literature for centuries.115 If students cannot address such
topics116 for fear of a teacher’s reaction, speech rights are clearly
implicated.117 While it is true LaVine’s rights in composing the poem
were unaffected until he took the poem to school, it must be remembered
that the best resource typically available to a teenager seeking to expand
his or her creative abilities is the high school English teacher.

type of inflammatory material in schools. That is the very point of this analysis and Comment;
however, the fact that a given material might be considered inflammatory does not mean that it is not
protected speech. The recipient standard would result in unduly severe self-censorship for fear of
punishment, restrict burgeoning artistic abilities, and suppress warning signs that need to be brought
to the surface.
114. The court held that, given the risk of “substantial disruption of or material interference
with school activities,” the school’s actions were justified. LaVine, 257 F.3d at 990–92.
115. One need only look to the works of Shakespeare, or paintings by the Old Masters, to
confirm that death and conflict, along with love and God, have been primary themes of art for
centuries.
116. Some may argue that while these topics may be legitimate artistic subjects, the treatment
by the students is generally remarkably different than the more traditional, academically-sanctioned
means of expression. This argument fails, however, because art, offensive to some, is often held up
as genius by others. For example, one need look no further than the borderline pornographic
photography of Robert Mapplethorpe and the often vulgar poetry of Allen Ginsburg.
117. Importantly, James LaVine presented his violent poem to his English teacher in a creative
writing context. He had written a poem about a timely topic of interest to youth and sincerely sought
feedback from a teacher he respected. If students cannot freely express themselves at the very least
in what is an undeniably creative context, where can they express themselves? If a high school
student were to write a scholarly research paper similar to this Comment, would that trigger an
immediate response on the part of educators? The answer seems to be “perhaps,” further establishing
the problems of a chilling effect on speech that might result if we have to rely on the student gauging
what reaction their communication will cause. Admittedly, this author’s viewpoint is one which
undeniably places great value on creativity and the importance of free speech to cultivate it. Other
perspectives certainly exist, but are not treated in this Comment.
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Two recent circuit cases attempted to clarify the true threat doctrine
in the school setting but arrived at contrasting outcomes. In Doe v.
Pulaski County Special School District, eighth grader Josh Mahan
showed violent, misogynistic, “Eminem-like” rants against his exgirlfriend to a friend who secretly stole the letters and shared them with
the girlfriend while on campus.118 The Eighth Circuit, in a sharply
divided en banc decision overturning the panel decision, found that the
letters constituted a true threat and were not protected.119 The majority
acknowledged that a speaker must intentionally or knowingly
communicate a statement to someone before the speaker can be
punished.120 Finding that the standard is satisfied if the speaker
communicates the statement “to the object of the purported threat or to a
third party,”121 the court found that Mahan manifested the intent to
convey the threat by allowing his friend to read it.122 The majority
applied the reasonable recipient standard and found that the speech was a
true threat given the impact it had on the ultimate recipient: the girl to
whom the “threat” was directed.123 This analysis was independent of the
threshold question of whether the speech was on-campus (having been
shown to the girl by a friend).
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Porter v. Ascension Parish School
Board124 is a stark contrast with Pulaski. In Porter, the facts of which
served as the introduction of this Comment,125 the Fifth Circuit held that
since Adam Porter showed his violent drawing of the school under siege
only to his mother, his younger brother, and a friend, all within the
home,126 he did not intentionally communicate the expression to anyone

118. 306 F.3d 616, 619–20 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc). The Eighth Circuit decided the case
shortly before the Supreme Court’s ruling in Black, but has been cited by courts interpreting student
speech in the time since Black. See, e.g., Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 613, 617
(5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2530 (2005); Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 786
(E.D. Mich. 2002).
119. Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 618, 626–27.
120. Id. at 624 (citing Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of
Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002)).
121. Id. (citing United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826, 831–32 (10th Cir. 1986); Hawaii v.
Chung, 862 P.2d 1063, 1071–73 (Haw. 1993)).
122. Id. at 624–25. The dissent argued that such logic “unreasonably stretches facts and law”
and that Mahan did not intend to communicate the threat. Id. at 629 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 624–26.
124. 393 F.3d 608.
125. See supra Part I.
126. 393 F.3d at 617.
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else, and thus failed to meet that initial threshold.127 In Pulaski, the
expression was shared only with one friend, also within the home, yet the
Eighth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion.128
Given the inconsistency of the Circuits in determining if a speaker
has intentionally communicated a threat, school administrators lack a
clear precedent upon which to model their own interpretation of what
constitutes a threat.129 Consequently, administrators are prone to classify
virtually everything as a threat, regardless of its actual nature, and then
allow the courts to sort it out later at the expense of taxpayers.130 This is
an inadequate remedy since students have only a finite time in high
school. The immediate result of this trend is that students are stripped of
First Amendment protections until courts restore their rights. An
excellent example of this problem is embodied in the increased
popularity of zero-tolerance policies in many schools.
B. Warning Signs and the Zero-Tolerance Policies
That Risk Suppressing Them
One of the most significant developments affecting student speech
rights is the increased adoption of “zero tolerance”131 policies that
empower school districts to automatically extend severe punishments in
disciplining students for even a slight infraction of school rules regarding
guns, alcohol, threats, and so forth.132 Though they often relate to non-

127. Id. at 618.
128. Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 619, 624.
129. As seen in the discussion of on-campus and off-campus speech, administrators are again
denied a clear rule to follow in that regard.
130. See, e.g., Torsten Ove, Court Rules School Policy Violates Pupils’ Free Speech,
PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, Feb. 28, 2003, at E7 (describing a $60,000 settlement stemming from a
lawsuit over student expression).
131. According to a recent A.B.A. Report,
“Zero tolerance” is the phrase that describes America’s response to student misbehavior.
Zero tolerance means that a school will automatically and severely punish a student for a
variety of infractions. While zero tolerance began as a Congressional response to students
with guns, gun cases are the smallest category of school discipline cases. Indeed, zero
tolerance covers the gamut of student misbehavior, from including “threats” in student
fiction to giving aspirin to a classmate. Zero tolerance has become a one-size-fits-all
solution to all the problems that schools confront. It has redefined students as criminals,
with unfortunate consequences.
RALPH C. MARTIN, AM. BAR ASS’N, ZERO TOLERANCE POLICY: REPORT (2001), available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/zerotolreport.html.
132. See Lynda Hils, “Zero Tolerance” for Free Speech, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 365 (2001);
Margaret Graham Tebo, Zero Tolerance, Zero Sense, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2000, at 40, 40–46, 113.
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speech behavioral elements exceeding the scope of this Comment, such
policies illustrate one extreme approach in reaction to school violence.
In theory, a zero-tolerance policy for any speech considered to be
threatening can help rid schools of potentially violent students.133
Unfortunately, “these same policies [can] stifle a young voice that may
be crying for help, or trying to show society its inadequacies, or merely
expressing anger through creative expressions.”134 The American Bar
Association officially opposes zero-tolerance policies as “one size fits
all” policies that “eliminate the common sense that comes with discretion
and, at great cost to society and to children and families, do little to
improve school safety.”135 Such polices have enjoyed increasing
popularity136 despite the fact that homicides in school are, in fact, very
rare events. A recent congressional report asserts that “[i]n the case of
youth violence, it is important to note that, statistically speaking, schools
are among the safest places for children to be.”137 In any given year, a
student is three to four times more likely to be hit by lightning than to be
the victim of violence in school.138 Yet an atmosphere of fear has
become pervasive in the nation’s schools.139 Fueled by media hype, fear
of the unthinkable and, perhaps, a bit of guilt,140 more parents are
demanding that school boards implement strict policies to deal with kids
133. MARTIN, supra note 131.
134. Hils, supra note 132, at 365.
135. MARTIN, supra note 131.
136. The general idea seems to be that if any suggestion of violence is summarily cast out of
the school environment, the school is that much safer. Unfortunately, this logic is flawed, as seen by
the tragic events following Kip Kinkel’s expulsion from high school, and other similar events. See
infra notes 149–50 and accompanying text. Expulsion does not prevent a student from returning to
campus with a weapon. In fact, as attested to by many school shootings such as Columbine, the
shooters did not shoot in the midst of taking classes. Instead, the students typically began shooting as
soon as they arrived on campus. See, e.g., supra note 16.
137. Bipartisan Working Group on Youth Violence, 106th Congress, Final Report, Nov. 17,
1999,
available
at
9,
http://www.house.gov/scott/bipartisan_working_group
_youth_violence_106th_final.pdf. Further discussion of this actuality is provided by the A.B.A.:
Nationwide, statistics gathered by the Justice Policy Institute and the U.S. Department of
Education show that crime of all sorts is down at public schools since 1990—some
studies say by as much as 30 percent. Less than 1 percent of all violent incidents
involving adolescents occur on school grounds. Indeed, a child is three times more likely
to be struck by lightning than to be killed violently at school.
MARTIN, supra note 131.
138. Johanna Wald, The Failure of Zero Tolerance, SALON, Aug. 29, 2001,
http://www.salon.com/mwt/feature/2001/08/29/zero_tolerance/index.html.
139. See generally Lewis, supra note 10, at 336.
140. Many school shooters came from troubled homes or exhibited warnings signs that went
unheeded by their parents.
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who step out of line.141 Unfortunately, the zero-tolerance policies being
implemented across the country are snaring large numbers of regular kids
in the broad nets designed to fish for safety threats.142
Significantly, many school shooters have exhibited warning signs in
anticipation of the attacks.143 One school shooter wrote a series of
violent poems before actually committing violence:
Am I insane
To want to end this pain
To want to end my life
By using a sharp knife
....
Am I insane
Wanting to spill blood like rain
Sending them all to Hell
From humanity I’ve fell.144

The teacher who read the poetry recommended the student receive help,
but the student did not receive help and subsequently killed two adults at
his school.145 Another troubled student wrote:
“Murder”
It’s my first murder
I’m at the point of no return

141. MARTIN, supra note 131.
142. Id. (quoting Tebo, supra note 132, at 40, 40–46, 113.). The A.B.A. Report includes
various examples of students unjustly caught in the net of zero tolerance. The following are two such
examples:
In Ponchatoula Louisiana, a 12-year-old who had been diagnosed with a hyperactive
disorder warned the kids in the lunch line not to eat all the potatoes, or “I’m going to get
you.” The student, turned in by the lunch monitor, was suspended for two days. He was
then referred to police by the principal, and the police charged the boy with making
“terroristic threats.” He was incarcerated for two weeks while awaiting trial. . . . In
Denton County, Texas, a 13-year-old was asked to write a “scary” Halloween story for a
class assignment. When the child wrote a story that talked about shooting up a school, he
both received a passing grade by his teacher and was referred to the school principal’s
office. The school officials called the police, and the child spent six days in jail before the
courts confirmed that no crime had been committed.
Id.
143. See Sarah E. Redfield, Threats Made, Threats Posed: School and Judicial Analysis in
Need of Redirection, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 663, 666.
144. Id. at 666–67.
145. Id. at 667.
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I look at his body on the floor
Killing a bastard that deserves to die
Ain’t nuthin’ like it in the world
But he sure did bleed a lot.146

The teacher who received this poem did not tell a counselor or an
administrator about it. The student proceeded to shoot two students and a
teacher at his middle school.147 As evidenced by these instances and
others like them,148 warning signs do exist, and administrators would be
remiss to ignore them. The appropriate reaction to a warning sign is
counseling, investigation, and due caution, not punishment. Under a
zero-tolerance policy, a student would be discouraged from letting any
school officials see such work, thus limiting the school’s ability to help.
In the instances above, the absence of a zero-tolerance policy
encouraged the students to submit their work and, consequently, the
warning signs surfaced. The problem came when the warning signs went
unaddressed. Schools must encourage speech and be prepared to respond
appropriately when warning signs appear. Had the appropriate authorities
met with the students and their families and contextualized the poems,
they could have learned of the legitimate danger and dealt with it,
thereby averting tragedy. In contrast to these cases in which the warning
signs surfaced, experience demonstrates that a zero-tolerance policy that
immediately suspends or expels a student might not actually create a
safer environment. Consider the following examples.
Kip Kinkel, a high school freshman, was immediately expelled from
school after being caught storing a gun in his locker—a clear violation of
his school’s zero-tolerance policy.149 He murdered both his parents that
night and returned to school the next day, killing two classmates and
wounding twenty-five others.150 More than punishment when initially
caught with the gun, Kip Kinkel needed help, counseling, and

146. Id. (quoting Youth’s Poems, CINCINATTI POST, Web ed., Nov. 10, 1998,
http://www.cincypost.com/news/1998/write111098.html.).
147. Id. at 668.
148. The recent shootings at Red Lake are a particularly disturbing and effective example. In
the days following the shootings, various warning signs—from a shockingly violent flash animation
the killer made, to his personal website that suggested school shootings in the near future, and his
open admiration of Hitler and a previous school shooter—came to light, begging the question: how
were these warning signs ignored?
149. Frontline, The Killer at Thurston High: Chronology, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/kinkel/kip/cron.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2005).
150. Id.
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intervention.151 When the school took a hard-line stance with him, he
reacted violently and the warning sign he exhibited remanifested itself as
an attack. Granted, it is impossible to know whether the violence would
still have occurred without the expulsion—it seems illogical to believe
that the expulsion caused his reaction, rather than merely serving as the
trigger for what had been long coming. However, the fact remains that
Kinkel’s actions presented the school with a clear warning sign, and the
school still chose punishment over counseling. The end result was
violence.
In contrast, a seventeen-year-old Arkansas honor student’s college
scholarship was endangered by a forty-five-day sentence to an alternative
school when an arbitrary search of his car by school officials revealed no
drugs, but a scraper and pocketknife that his father had inadvertently left
the night before after fixing a mirror.152 Despite his desperate father’s
pleas, the school system adamantly insisted on sustaining its zerotolerance policy.153 While both of these examples pertain to a zerotolerance policy in the weapons context, the same basic idea is true in a
speech context as well: zero tolerance is overinclusive so as to unduly
punish the harmless, while failing to actually prevent violence.
C. Guidelines To Determine When Danger Exists
If traditional, legal threat analysis is inadequate, and zero-tolerance
policies ineffective, the question becomes: how should risks be identified
in schools? Steps have been taken to properly identify and respond to
legitimate threats. The United States Secret Service and the United States
Department of Education jointly produced Threat Assessment in Schools:
A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe
School Climates (“Guide”).154 As expected, the joint report upon which
the Guide was based found that some school attacks may indeed have
been preventable.155 The resultant Guide represented a modification of
the Secret Service threat assessment process—first pioneered as a way of
assessing threats against the President of the United States and other
protected officials156—based upon findings from the Safe School
151. Punishment was also certainly appropriate given that Kip Kinkel had a firearm on
campus. However, even when punishment is appropriate, it should be accompanied by help.
152. Wald, supra note 138.
153. Id.
154. FEIN ET AL., supra note 23.
155. Id. at 4.
156. Id. at 4–5.
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Initiative.157 The Guide suggested eleven key questions to use in
assessing a threat:
1.

What are the student’s motives and goals?

2.

Have there been any communications suggesting ideas or intent to
attack?

3.

Has the subject shown inappropriate interest in [school attacks or
attackers, weapons, or incidents of mass violence]?

4.

Has the student engaged in attack related behaviors?

5.

Does the student have the capacity to carry out an act of targeted
violence?

6.

Is the student experiencing hopelessness, desperation, and/or
despair?

7.

Does the student have a trusting relationship with at least one
responsible adult?

8.

Does the student see violence as an acceptable or desirable or the
only way to solve problems?

9.

Is the student’s conversation and “story” consistent with his or her
actions?

10. Are other people concerned about the student’s potential for
violence?
11. What circumstances might affect the likelihood of an attack?158

A key principle underlying these suggested questions is the
importance of properly contextualizing each perceived threat or warning
sign, rather than viewing the incident isolated from other potentially
mitigating elements such as a happy home life, an even temperament, or
strong adult role models.159 It is important that school administrators
deal with each event rationally on a case-by-case basis rather than by
overreacting or applying the blanket response mandated by a zerotolerance policy.160 These proposed questions are not binding law,161 and
educators are under no legal duty to follow them. However, by using
157. Id. The Safe School Initiative was a joint study conducted by the Secret Service and the
Department of Education. The study examined thirty-seven incidents of targeted school violence that
occurred in the United States from December 1974 through May 2000 when researchers concluded
their data collection. Id. at 11.
158. Id. at 63–66.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 32.
161. No court has yet adopted these rules in analysis.
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questions such as these—as discussed in the following analysis162—and
by doing so on a case-by-case basis, educators can make considerable
strides towards improving school safety while continuing to protect
student speech rights.
IV. BRIGHT-LINE RULES AND THREAT ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES
It is difficult to achieve a balance between the duty of educators to
assure the safety of a school and the speech rights of students. The
perception of school violence may be worse than the reality of school
violence, but it is nevertheless a valid concern.163 Many past shooters left
warning signs,164 and, in retrospect, some instances of violence were
preventable.165 The First Amendment should never be used to insulate
legitimate threats or warning signs from appropriate response. Educators
must respond quickly and decisively lest a warning sign be missed and
another tragic act of violence occur. At the same time, however, it is
important that students who pose no actual threat not be inadvertently
caught up in an overly broad net meant to avert the next Columbine or
Red Lake massacre. Consequently, school administrators’ evaluations of
student threats and warning signs should be viewed as a two-step
process:
(1) determining whether it is within their jurisdiction (the on-campus/offcampus question), and if so, (2) determining if it actually threatens
school safety.166 These two clarifications of the law and procedure
simplify the duty of violence prevention for educators, protect student
speech, and—through the additional warning signs that will surface in
the increased flow of student speech—provide for greater school safety.

162. See infra Part IV.
163. School shootings may indeed be rare in proportion to the total number of students
attending American high schools. However, many other things, such as terrorist attacks, are similarly
rare in proportion. Such a fact does not detract from the importance of preventing such attacks.
164. See Redfield, supra note 143, at 666.
165. See FEIN ET AL., supra note 23, at 4.
166. This is a subtle, but important, distinction; determining whether something actually
“threatens school safety” is distinct from determining whether something is “a threat.” A “threat,” as
it has been discussed here, is essentially a legal term only, separating a category of speech as less
protected, regardless of whether or not it actually endangers safety. In contrast, something that
actually threatens school safety is a very legitimate danger, often foreshadowed by warning signs.
By focusing exclusively on the legal concept of a “threat,” the real danger to schools is unaddressed.
Many warnings signs, for example, might not actually be communicated intentionally and would
thus evade a “threat” classification.
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A. Bright Line Rules Distinguishing Between
In-School/Out-of-School Speech
1. The proposal
The difference between “in-school” and “out-of-school” speech is
simple, at least semantically, yet is prone to over-analysis: “in-school,”
or “on-campus,” means that the speech is physically on campus or at a
school-sponsored event, and “off-campus” means the speech is
physically off campus, isolated from any school sponsored event.167 Oncampus speech is speech that occurs on campus or speech that is created
in a fixed form—writing, drawings, and so forth—off campus and
brought to campus according to the direct will of its creator.168 This
definition of on-campus speech excludes speech made in a tangible fixed
form that remains off campus and speech brought to campus without its
creator’s direct intent.
2. How the bright-line distinction will affect the analysis and procedure
for administrators addressing perceived dangers
Acknowledging
the
increasing
prevalence
of
internet
communication, school administrators should treat any electronic
communications as off-campus speech unless its speaker downloads it on
campus or encourages other students to do so.169 This is the same
standard described in Thomas v. Board of Education, which asserted
“that the arm of authority does not reach beyond the schoolhouse
gate.”170 The allowance for “substantial disruption within the school
from some remote locale”171 has extended the reach of the arm of school
authority well beyond the schoolhouse gate and into students’ homes.172
167. See also Thomas v. Bd. of Educ. 607 F.2d 1043, 1044 (2d Cir. 1979). See generally
Calvert, supra note 19, at 271.
168. This is my own synthesis of the existing law, as discussed in Parts II.A and II.B, and how
the law should be ideally.
169. Calvert, supra note 19, at 285.
170. 607 F.2d at 1044–45.
171. Id. at 1052 n.17.
172. By haphazardly characterizing otherwise obviously off-campus speech as “on-campus
speech” because it might potentially trigger on-campus disruption, virtually any off-campus speech
can be reclassified as on-campus. This is because, given the expansive definition of what is an
objectively reasonable belief for an educator in the wake of school shootings, virtually any speech
may be treated as possessing such threatening potential. For instance, giving “the finger” to a teacher
off campus may so disturb the teacher that he or she is unable to adequately teach class, thus causing
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Including the “substantial disruption within the school from some
remote locale” concept in defining on-campus and off-campus speech is
particularly problematic because of the post-Columbine climate of fear
lingering in America’s schools.173 Educators are aware of the warning
signs predicting previous school shootings174 and are prone to interpret
any hint of violence as foreshadowing on-campus violence, thus putting
any speech at risk of creating “substantial disruption within the school.”
Such logic collapses the on- and off-campus distinction: if educators
plausibly see any mention of violence as potentially causing on-campus
disruption, the speech is susceptible to on-campus regulation, and student
speech rights vanish.
Since on-campus speech is offered less protection than off-campus
speech,175 wrongly classifying off-campus speech deprives otherwise
protected speech of the protection it deserves. 176 Lesser protection is
based on the presumption that the school administration will not reach
beyond school premises to exact punishment and that students are thus
able to fully enjoy speech rights away from school.177 This presumption
is demonstrated, for example, in the context of school uniforms.178
In Canady v. Bassier Parish School Board, the Fifth Circuit noted
that while “students are restricted from wearing clothing of their choice
at school, [they] remain free to wear what they want after school
hours.”179 If a school policy mandated specific student dress at all times,
in or out of school, it would not pass constitutional muster.180 Yet, with

on-campus disruption. Alternately, rumors of such an incident occurring could lead to a widespread
lack of respect within the school for that teacher, again leading to disruption when the teacher is
unable to control the classroom.
173. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Such fear was no doubt reinvigorated by the
Red Lake shootings.
174. See Redfield, supra note 143, at 666.
175. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (upholding regulation
of student speech that is related to school sponsored activities); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675 (1986) (upholding regulation of student speech that is lewd, vulgar, obscene, or plainly
offensive); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (prohibiting
viewpoint-specific regulations unless the regulated speech substantially interferes with the work of
the school); Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding regulations
which further substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of student expression).
176. See supra Part II.B.
177. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
178. See Canady, 240 F.3d at 443.
179. Id.
180. Such a regulation would prevent students from expressing themselves through their attire,
a practice which the Canady court assumed to be valid expression. Id. at 443.
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regard to student speech, the “potential disruption” standard amounts to
precisely such omnipresent enforcement. If school administrators
regulate a student’s off-campus expression as on-campus speech by
virtue of “potential disruption,” the in-school context will be extended to
the out-of-school context and the student has no forum, on campus or off,
to express himself.
Of course, freedom of speech is not absolute,181 and a legitimate
threat is not protected from prosecution,182 whether on or off campus.
When such speech exists entirely off campus, however, it should still be
treated properly as off-campus speech183 and be under the jurisdiction of
law enforcement instead of school administration. The law provides
remedies for threats made in any locale, and if the threat is legitimate,
police can intervene.184 Educators can, and should, still take nonpunitive
steps to reach out to that student and prevent violence. They can allow
off-campus law enforcement to address legitimate threats and use their
unique vantage point as educators to help a student without resorting to
punishment as a weapon. Consequently, a clear line of demarcation can
be established between on-campus and off-campus speech that expressly
designates speech neither created on nor intentionally brought to campus
as off-campus speech.185 Such a clarification will better enable educators
to make quick, decisive appraisals of situations that arise186 while
sparing the school district the litigation expenses that could otherwise
result.187 A clear delineation of off-campus and on-campus speech—such
as that proposed188—will better enable educators to delegate
responsibility for threatening off-campus speech to appropriate law

181. See supra notes 86–105 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
183. This does not mean that warning signs should be ignored. It merely means that if it is a
threat, the police should be notified. If it is a warning sign, appropriate, nonpunitive steps should be
taken to help the student and solve the problem. Punishment is not the cure for warning signs.
184. See Calvert, supra note 19, at 285 (articulating that “off-campus remedies exist for offcampus expression”).
185. Punishing a student who cheats, for example, by sharing answers with his classmates,
would not be implicated by this standard since such behavior would be punished as conduct—
cheating—rather than as speech.
186. By applying clear standards to determine if the school has jurisdiction, administrators
will be able to delegate off-campus enforcement to the police and focus their own time and resources
on on-campus issues.
187. Supra note 130.
188. See Part IV.A. Speech that occurs on campus, or is created in a fixed form off campus
and subsequently brought to campus according to the direct will of its creator, is on-campus speech.
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enforcement agencies who can investigate further.189 As a result, school
resources will be available to address actual on-campus issues, rather
than wasting time and effort unnecessarily policing off-campus activity.
Ideally, a clear definition of on-campus versus off-campus speech
would be established via Supreme Court precedent.190 In the absence of
such a precedent, however, school districts—or even state legislatures—
can proceed in establishing internal rules governing and defining the oncampus/off-campus distinction.191 By establishing a clear definition that
classifies speech neither created on nor intentionally brought to campus
as off-campus speech, the district or legislature will be operating
comfortably within the parameters already established by courts192 that
immunize the jurisdictional component of the school response against
extensive litigation.193 Educators will be better able to focus on the
remaining speech that is properly classified as on-campus, which will
lead to administrators missing fewer warning signs and paying more
careful attention to troubled students. Of course, administrators will still
need to evaluate that on-campus speech. It is in that regard that the
implementation of threat assessment guidelines will be beneficial.194

189. Police agencies, unencumbered by the educational tasks faced by schools, can likely
perform a more in-depth, comprehensive threat assessment. Furthermore, whereas students can be
expelled or suspended without due process, any police action is subject to due process, assuring a
greater protection of the students’ rights.
190. As witnessed by the problems of dueling circuits, any judicial precedent short of the
Supreme Court may merely add to the confusion faced by educators. See supra notes 73–78 and
accompanying text (discussing the Emmett and Killion decisions).
191. Such internal rules have already been adopted with respect to zero-tolerance policies and
other measures. See the discussion of zero-tolerance policies in Part III.
192. See Part II.B.
193. Contrast this with the litigation discussed throughout this Comment.
194. It would also be an excellent idea for law enforcement and courts to adopt similar
guidelines in evaluating threats made by juveniles. Although beyond the scope of this Comment, the
adoption of such policies would recognize the significant differences between adult and adolescent
styles of communication. As discussed at greater length in the next Part, adolescent communication
is inevitably colored by a variety of variables, ranging from popular culture to typical adolescent
stresses, anxieties, and insecurities that accompany the teen years.
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B. The Implementation of Threat Assessment Guidelines
in Lieu of the Traditional “Threat” Analysis
1. The proposal
To properly evaluate student threats, a more comprehensive system
of threat evaluation is needed.195 An ideal policy or set of guidelines will
resemble the eleven questions set forth by the Secret Service and
Department of Education.196 The questions represent a multi-faceted
approach securely placing a student’s expression within the larger
context of his life rather than isolating the speech from all other variables
and interpreting it through a prism darkened by fear of school violence.
The inclusion of language addressing and acknowledging the inherently
hyperbolic nature of adolescent speech as well as the influence of
popular culture, particularly music, on their verbal expression would also

195. In addition to the Secret Service proposed questions, other approaches exist. The National
School Safety Center created a profile of behaviors that could indicate a youth’s propensity for
violence against others based on characteristics of those who have already committed such crimes.
Checklist of Characteristics of Youth Who Have Caused School-Associated Violent Deaths, National
School Safety Center, http://www.nssc1.org/reporter/checklist.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2005).
“The 20-item checklist includes drug abuse, tantrums, threats, depression, truancy, cruelty to
animals and a fascination with weapons and violence that spills over into schoolwork.” Mike Anton
& Lisa Levitt Ryckman, In Hindsight Signs of Danger Were Apparent, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, May 2,
1999, at 4A. Such profiles, however, can be problematic since they often apply to many teenagers
who never become violent—every loner sitting alone at lunch or heavy-metal fan dressed in black is
not a potential shooter. A report by the U.S. Surgeon General asserts that “[n]o single risk factor or
set of risk factors is powerful enough to predict with certainty that youths will become violent.” U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 61
(2001), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/youthviolence/index.html.
The National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s Critical Incident Response Group also published its findings regarding threat
evaluation. The report states in part,
In the shock-wave of recent school shootings, [the severe] reaction may be
understandable, but it is exaggerated—and perhaps dangerous, leading to potential
underestimation of serious threats, overreaction to less serious ones, and unfairly
punishing or stigmatizing students who are in fact not dangerous. A school that treats all
threats as equal falls into the fallacy formulated by Abraham Maslow: “If the only tool
you have is a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail.”
Mary Ellen O’Toole, CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP, THE SCHOOL SHOOTER: A THREAT
ASSESSMENT PERSPECTIVE
5
(2000)
available
at
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/
school/school2.pdf. The report defines a true threat as “an expression of intent to do harm or act out
violently against someone or something.” Id. at 6. Unfortunately, such a simple definition would be
just as problematic to free speech as the current approaches courts use. Further, it might be
underinclusive regarding safety as it fails to consider other factors that indicate potential violence.
196. See FEIN ET AL., supra note 23, at 63–66.
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be helpful.197 The impact of violent music on adolescent expression is
pertinent and also should be considered.198 In short, all violence is not
created equal. Educators and courts need a clear, uniform way to
distinguish true threats and actual warning signs from violent yet
harmless adolescent speech.
2. How it will affect the procedure and analysis
In order to explain how the guidelines will affect the procedure and
analysis, one must look to the unique nature of adolescent speech. Most
teenagers communicate differently than adults. The teen years are a
difficult period punctuated with bouts of self-doubt, insecurity, and anger
toward authority.199 This phenomenon is emphasized by many teens’
tendency to speak in hyperbole, characterizing each event in their lives as
critical, pivotal, or otherwise earth-shattering.200 Teens’ verbal
communication—both oral and written—is often colored by the media
they consume.201 “Today’s lingo is largely a by-product of hip hop,
filtered through rap music with the predictable undertow of antimainstream culture.”202 “Let’s bounce” means “let’s leave,” jewelry is
referred to as “bling bling,” money as “chedda,” and friends are
“dawg[s].”203 Given the increasingly violent tone of music,204 the

197. See infra notes 200–09 and accompanying text.
The impact of music with lyrics promoting violence on adolescent behavior, though briefly
discussed below, exceeds the scope of this Comment. See, e.g., An Examination of the Entertainment
Industry’s Efforts To Curb Children’s Exposure to Violent Content: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Telecommunications and the Internet of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong.
(2001); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 195, at 85–94; TELEVISION VIOLENCE
AND PUBLIC POLICY (James T. Hamilton ed., 1998). See generally Robert Corn-Revere, Regulating
TV Violence: The FCC’s National Rorschach Test, COMM. LAW., Fall 2004, at 1.
198. See, e.g., infra notes 200–09 and accompanying text.
199. See Kelly O’Rourke, “I Have To Change!” The Role of the Adolescent in the Family, in
Yale-New Haven Teachers Institute, in CURRICULUM UNIT: THE FAMILY IN LITERATURE (1986),
available
at
http://www.yale.edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/1986/1/
86.01.07.x.html.
200. See generally Raymond W. Gibbs, Irony in Talk Among Friends, 15 METAPHOR &
SYMBOL 5 (2000).
201. See generally Michael Newman, I Represent Me: Identity Construction in a Teenage Rap
Crew, 44 TEX. LINGUISTIC FORUM 388 (2001), available at http://studentorgs.utexas.edu/salsa/
salsaproceedings/salsa9/papers/newman.pdf.
202. See Jennifer Wells, Generation Rap: A Pocket Lexicon of Teen Lingo, TODAY’S PARENT,
Aug.
2003,
at
87,
available
at
http://www.todaysparent.com/preteen/
behaviordevelopment/article.jsp?content=20030708_110619_892.
203. Id.
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persuasion of popular media on teens’ thoughts inevitably injects an
undercurrent of violence into many teens’ communication—an
undercurrent which, though probably just harmless imitation of their
favorite musician, may alarm already nervous educators.
In the song Kim, popular rapper Eminem graphically depicted the
fictional murder of his real-life wife.205 Amidst the torrent of profanity
riddled lyrics depicting the wife’s violent death, Eminem included
various disturbing references. For example:
So now they both dead and you slash your own throat
So now it’s double homicide and suicide with no note
....
You can’t run from me Kim
It’s just us, nobody else!
You’re only making this harder on yourself
Ha! Ha! Got’cha!
[screaming]
Ha! Go ahead yell!
Here I’ll scream with you!
AH SOMEBODY HELP!
Don’t you get it b____, no one can hear you?
....
You were supposed to love me
[sound of Kim choking]
NOW BLEED! B____ BLEED!
BLEED! B____ BLEED! BLEED!206

The album in which Kim appeared, The Marshall Mathers LP, sold
nearly eight million copies, making it the second best selling album of
2000,207 and won a Grammy award for best rap album.208

204. Rap music has grown increasingly violent over the past decades, evolving from relatively
innocuous artists such as Grandmaster Flash and the Sugarhill Gang, to more sinister acts such as
N.W.A. and 2Pac, to recent performers such as Eminem and 50 Cent, who often boasts of his violent
background and the number of times he has been shot.
205. For a discussion of the song, see Toure, Recordings: The Marshall Mathers LP, ROLLING
STONE,
July
6,
2000,
at
135
available
at
http://www.rollingstone.com/
reviews/album/_/id/315749.
206. EMINEM, Kim, on THE MARSHALL MATHERS LP (Aftermath Records 2000). Lyrics are
available at http://www.anysonglyrics.com/lyrics/e/eminem/kim.htm.
207. Record Sales Up 4% in 2000—Despite Napster & MP3.com, AVREV.COM, Jan. 3, 2000,
http://www.audiorevolution.com/news/0101/03.soundscan.shtml. In total sales, Eminem trailed only
teen-pop group ‘N Sync. Id.
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Not surprisingly, the lyrics of Kim are comparable to the letters
written by eighth grader Josh Mahan in Pulaski.209 Many of Mahan’s
lyrics, written during the summer of 2000210 when Eminem’s album
ruled the music charts, are strikingly similar to Kim:
My hatred and aggression will go towards you, you better run
b____, cuz I can’t control what I do. I’ll murder you before you can
think twice, cut you up and use you for decoration to look nice. . . .211

While not savory, the lyrics reflect the musical tastes of a generation.
Yet, despite this seemingly obvious imitation of a teenager’s favorite
musician, the school administration expelled Josh from school and the
Eighth Circuit deemed the song a true threat.212 Had an adult written
such lyrics, as Eminem did, it might indeed be more appropriate to treat
it as a valid threat. Of course, Eminem instead won a Grammy.213
However, it would be reasonable to conclude that the eighth grader was
merely frustrated by a breakup with his girlfriend and was expressing his
feelings the best way he knew: rap, modeled after the example set by his
role model, Eminem.214 By all means, the song is reason for concern and
should be given appropriate attention. But, it is important to
acknowledge that Mahan’s concept of socially acceptable
communication was affected by the Eminem song. The dissent in Pulaski
recognized this fact, writing that Josh Mahan
thought Eminem’s lyrics were the best source of inspiration for his
catharsis. Today’s teenagers witness, experience, and hear violence on
television, in music, in movies, in video games, and for some, in
abusive relationships at home. It is hardly surprising that such violence

208. See
Grammy
Awards
Web
Page,
http://www.grammy.com/awards/search/
index.aspx.
209. Doe v. Pulaski, 306 F.3d 616, 619, 625 (8th Cir. 2002).
210. Id. at 620.
211. Redfield, supra note 143, at 731 n.291 (quoting Jones v. State, 64 S.W.3d 728, 730 (Ark.
2002)).
212. Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 620, 626.
213. This discussion is not meant to suggest that the mere fact a potential threat is modeled
after song lyrics should defeat the threat analysis. However, where a song is particularly popular—as
Kim was—and the “threat” is obviously an imitation, it should certainly affect the analysis. Where in
the past, youth might have modeled their musings over failed romance after Beatles or Billy Joel
lyrics, today’s generation instead turns to rap. Consequently, they are expressing their feelings in a
decidedly more violent way—regardless of whether or not they actually intend to cause any harm.
214. This characterization parallels that set forth by the dissenting opinion in Pulaski. See
Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 631 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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is reflected in the way they express themselves and communicate with
their peers, particularly where adult supervision is lacking.215

Of course, it would be a massive error to automatically exonerate
any violent teenage speech as merely the imitation of popular music.
Teenagers are not mindless drones simply repeating the lyrics they hear
pumping out of their iPods; they know the music is violent. In many
cases—though not necessarily all cases—they recognize the music might
not be socially acceptable in all contexts. Nevertheless, the fact that
Eminem and other popular performers express themselves violently
certainly makes such expression more acceptable in the minds of some
teenagers. Thus, it is also an error to automatically interpret such speech
as a threat. The music that influences teenagers at least must be
considered.
To avoid the misclassification of innocuous teenage communication
as a threat, threat assessment guidelines should accommodate the unique
nature of adolescent communication. The eleven key questions suggested
by the Secret Service and Department of Education when assessing a
threat allow for such an accommodation.216 In contrast, as shown in the
ensuing analysis, the five-factor test217 proposed by the Eighth Circuit in
Dinwiddie is too easily swayed by post-Columbine fears.218
Consequently, the Dinwiddie test is more prone to a false positive. While
these certainly are not the only two options, a comprehensive evaluation
of all the possible approaches is impractical. Hence, Dinwiddie is used as
an example of typical court approaches, and the Secret Service questions
provide a superior option. The contrast of these two approaches219 is
illustrated by retrospectively applying both tests to three specific
examples of varying threat: Porter,220 Pulaski,221 and the tragedy of

215. Id.
216. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
217. Supra note 104 and accompanying text. The five factors are (1) the reaction of those who
heard the alleged threat; (2) whether the threat was conditional; (3) whether the person who made the
threat communicated it directly to the object of the threat; (4) whether the speaker had a history of
making threats against the person purportedly threatened; and (5) whether the recipient had a reason
to believe that the speaker had a propensity to engage in violence. United States v. Dinwiddie, 76
F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996).
218. As previously discussed, this problem is also true with court approaches that look to the
impact a reasonable speaker would foresee.
219. To simplify this analysis, I am using the Dinwiddie test with its five factors rather than
the reasonable speaker tests. Regardless, I believe that the application of that approach would also
succumb to the subjectivity inherent in this context.
220. 393 F.3d 608, 611 (5th Cir. 2004).
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Columbine.222 Admittedly, three cases is a very small sample from
which to draw conclusions, and the analysis is inevitably affected by the
actions of school officials.223 Nevertheless, the following three cases
provide at least a minimal framework through which to evaluate the
different tests.
In Porter, most of the Secret Service questions224 can be readily
answered in the negative and, thus, the conclusion is easily reached that
no threat existed. Adam’s goals in drawing the imaginary siege of his
school were likely to express his frustration with school and vent anger.
There were no communications suggesting intent to attack, and Adam
had not exhibited any interest in school attacks, weapons, or incidents of
mass violence.225 Adam had not engaged in attack-related behaviors.
Although of adequate physical and mental capacities, according to the
court proceedings, Adam had no access to weapons—aside from a boxcutter for his after-school job.226 There was no indication of
hopelessness, desperation, or despair, nor was there indication he saw
violence as an acceptable way to solve problems. Adam had strong
trusting relationships with adults. His depiction of events was
inconsistent with his actions, and before the drawing surfaced, no one
was concerned about his potential violence. By thus applying the Secret
Service questions to Adam Porter’s case, it is clear his drawing did not

221. 306 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2003).
222. See supra note 15.
223. In Pulaski, for example, the student was expelled from school after his speech was
discovered—leaving unanswered the question of what might otherwise have happened.
224. Again, for the sake of convenience, the Secret Service questions are
1.
What are the student’s motives and goals?
2.
Have there been any communications suggesting ideas or intent to attack?
3.
Has the subject shown inappropriate interest in [school attacks or attackers, weapons,
or incidents of mass violence]?
4.
Has the student engaged in attack related behaviors?
5.
Does the student have the capacity to carry out an act of targeted violence?
6.
Is the student experiencing hopelessness, desperation, and/or despair?
7.
Does the student have a trusting relationship with at least one responsible adult?
8.
Does the student see violence as an acceptable or desirable or the only way to solve
problems?
9.
Is the student’s conversation and “story” consistent with his or her actions?
10. Are other people concerned about the student’s potential for violence?
11. What circumstances might affect the likelihood of an attack?
Supra note 158 and accompanying text.
225. See Porter, 393 F.3d at 611–12.
226. Id. at 612.
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constitute a true threat to school safety. In contrast, the Dinwiddie test—
with its emphasis on the perceptions of others—likely reaches a different
conclusion.
While three of the factors of the Dinwiddie test would not be
implicated—Adam had no history of making threats, did not
communicate the threat directly, and the threat was not conditional—two
important factors would be implicated: the reaction of those who heard
the alleged threat and whether the recipient had reason to believe Adam
had a propensity to engage in violence: in the wake of school shootings,
the drawing itself provided sufficient reason to believe that its creator
had a propensity for violence. Both of these factors are heavily
influenced by the post-Columbine fears of educators.
Similar to Adam Porter, Josh Mahan’s violent but harmless song
lyrics in Pulaski would be spared extensive scrutiny and punishment
under the Secret Service questions. His goal was likely to deal with anger
and frustration stemming from a failed teenage romance.227 He had
neither engaged in nor shown interest in attacks. As a scrawny fourteenyear old without access to weapons, it can be argued Josh Mahan lacked
the capacity to carry out attacks such as those described.228 Virtually
none of the other questions, applied to him, would suggest that he posed
a legitimate threat. If nothing else, the obvious hyperbole of his lyrics
should have lent additional credibility to the argument.229 After all,
Mahan boasted that he had already murdered his parents and, despite
being a white youth in rural Arkansas, claimed to be a member of the
Bloods, a predominately black gang.230 While it could be argued that the
lyrics represented a plan for who would be killed, it is too vague to
maintain such a conclusion (there were no details such as when, or
exactly how). Again, however, the same two Dinwiddie factors
implicated in Porter are implicated here. Nervous educators could argue
that since the song eventually reached the ex-girlfriend, direct
communication took place.231 Furthermore, given the context was a
break-up, it could be reasoned the threat was conditional. Four of the five
Dinwiddie factors would thus be implicated, resulting in a false positive
in terms of threat assessment. Looking back in retrospect, however, as

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
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the dissent acknowledged, Josh Mahan did not pose a real threat to
anyone.232
Applying the Secret Service questions to the Columbine shooters,
Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, the threat posed would be apparent
immediately. As some observers noted, “the clues were there. The
obsession with weapons, war and death. The endless rounds of bloody
computer games. The vicious rantings on the Internet.”233 Their written
communications crossed the line from expressing anguish to actually
plotting the attack and setting forth detailed plans and goals of how many
people would die.234 While Harris and Klebold had not actually engaged
in any attacks, they were enthralled with weaponry ranging from clubs
and knives to pipe bombs and the guns they tried to purchase whenever
possible.235 Both young men threatened violence through the Internet
and school assignments—violence was clearly an acceptable solution to
them.236 Interestingly, while the Secret Service questions would identify
the pair as a risk, they would not necessarily be declared much more
dangerous than Adam Porter under the Dinwiddie test.
Only three of the five factors in the Dinwiddie test are present in
Harris and Klebold’s case. The two factors implicated in Porter are also
implicated for Harris and Klebold: the reaction of those who heard the
alleged threat and whether the recipient had reason to believe the speaker
had a propensity to engage in violence. Harris and Klebold had a history
of making threats, but their threats were neither directly communicated
nor conditional and, therefore, do not qualify as threats under this
factor.237 Consequently, applying the Dinwiddie analysis suggests a
threat risk only marginally greater than that posed by Adam Porter and
slightly lesser than that posed by heart-broken, rap-loving eighth grader
Josh Mahan.
Of course, not all courts use the Dinwiddie test in evaluating
threats.238 However, the general principle illustrated by the application of
Dinwiddie to the three cases above is that any test designed for adults—
as most are—is inadequate when evaluating student threats in a school
environment scarred by past violence. Further, reliance on a legal
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 630 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
Anton & Ryckman, supra note 195.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text.
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definition of a true threat risks underinclusivity: teenage communications
may fail the first threshold of intent to communicate, yet still be
important warning signs that should be addressed. In short, it makes
more sense—when dealing with teenage speech in the school context—
to simply bypass the initial intent threshold to determine if speech
constitutes a threat and focus instead on whether actual danger exists.
The current systems of threat evaluation used by courts are designed
for a decidedly adult context, and because they neglect the existence of
warning signs, the systems are woefully inadequate in the school context.
The same problem is observed in educators who either model their own
responses after the existing court approaches,239 employ their own
common-sense judgment colored by fear of school violence, or adopt the
all-inclusive blanket approach of zero-tolerance policies.240 The adoption
of the Secret Service Guidelines will significantly improve educators’
ability to identify when a true danger exists and respond effectively.
As with the on-campus/off-campus distinction, the best way to adopt
a reasonable, youth-specific approach to threat appraisal is through
binding court precedent.241 In the absence of such precedent, however,
legislatures and school districts have the ability to adopt clear guidelines
administrators can follow.242 Schools, administrators, and state and local
governments have an interest in willingly adopting such policies because,
in addition to preserving First Amendment rights, such policies also
promise to be more effective in assuring school safety by encouraging
speech—consequently increasing the opportunity to identify warning
signs.243
C. Safety Benefits of These Proposals
By punishing speech that does not rise to the level of a “true threat,”
schools not only risk infringing on students’ First Amendment rights but
also risk stifling the voice of a potentially violent student. Threatening

239. See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 131.
241. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
242. Similarly, law enforcement officials can also incorporate these principles into their own
threat assessment process when dealing with youth.
243. See supra notes 106–30 and accompanying text. By producing false positives and failing
to properly contextualize threats, other approaches risk excluding from scrutiny the most dangerous
threats and focusing instead on non-threats. Further, zero-tolerance laws may be antithetical to the
goal of school safety by suppressing warning signs that should be brought to the surface.
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speech has little or no social value,244 but some value exists in the
warning of potential violence such speech provides. If a potentially
violent student’s voice is stifled by the threat of automatic
punishment,245 the risk of violence might worsen because the student
may seek other methods of expression such as underground newspapers
or Web sites, as was the case in the Red Lake shootings,246 or the student
simply might cease to outwardly express thoughts and feelings. Feelings
of rage and angst might remain hidden until they make themselves
known in more terrifying and tragic ways.
In contrast, if students are able to speak freely—like any adult—
when away from school, and if their speech in school is not
automatically subjected to punishment at the mere hint of frustration or
anger, their communication with others will increase. With greater
student speech, a student contemplating violence will be more likely to
express his feelings. Warning signs will surface and, with the appropriate
guidelines in place, can be dealt with. A danger known is much safer
than a danger that goes unspoken until it is too late. In this regard,
encouraging the open exchange of student speech is as vital to school
safety as it is to First Amendment rights.
V. CONCLUSION
Balancing the need for school safety and the rights of students to
express themselves is not an easy task. However, by implementing the
suggested clarifications, safety and free speech can coexist and augment
each other. Ultimately, this change consists of determining whether
speech is on-campus or off-campus. By drawing this distinction tightly,
educators will be able to focus on on-campus speech with greater
diligence and resources, allowing law enforcement officials to properly
regulate off-campus speech.
With their duties and responsibilities better defined, educators can
then dedicate the necessary time and effort to evaluate each perceived
danger carefully and on a case-by-case basis. While a blanket provision
proclaiming zero tolerance may appeal to parents and educators initially,
244. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
245. See discussion of zero-tolerance policies in Part III.
246. For example, before the shooting rampage at Red Lake High School, sixteen-year-old
Jeffrey Weise posted online a violent flash animation depicting a shooting. See School Killer’s
Animated Terror, supra note 13. The flash animation would not satisfy any of the required prongs to
be a threat, yet it would serve as a legitimate warning sign, which would have triggered a response.
The flash animation is one of several expressions of violence that Weise posted on an Internet site.
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such a policy merely serves to suppress warning signs and protected
speech alike. Such an approach offers little in terms of enhanced safety
while eradicating the concept of student speech rights. Strong and
decisive discipline is not necessarily the solution. Expelling or
suspending a student does not preclude the student from returning to
campus with a loaded gun. Rather, it serves to discourage open
expression that can provide warning signs and thus an opportunity to
prevent a violent outcome. As part of the evaluation process and
subsequent response, it is critical that educators make sure troubled
students receive the counseling and psychological help they need.247
Effectively identifying warning signs will allow educators and law
enforcement officials to respond accordingly by giving help and
counseling to students and by lessening the possibility of violent
outcomes. Rather than responding to school violence by stamping out all
student speech rights, the more effective approach will encourage candid
speech and effectively evaluate warning signs that surface in the flow of
open communication.
Richard Salgado

247. See generally Redfield, supra note 143.
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